Introduction
Lieutenant-Colonel José María Lemus, a protégé of President Oscar Osorio (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) ), rose to power in 1956. Lemus is often remembered as an authoritarian ruler, but at the outset of his presidency he allowed the return of exiles and abolished the "Law in Defense of Democratic and Constitutional Order," sanctioned during Osorio's anti-communist crackdown in 1952.
Lemus governed El Salvador during a period of declining prosperity as coffee prices plunged in the international markets, forcing an economic restructuring which had particularly negative consequences for the poor. But more importantly, the changing political landscape in Latin Despite these efforts, the State Department officials remained doubtful about Lemus' capacity to effectively fight communism.
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Analysts at the State Department's Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (OCPA) had ambivalent readings of the strength of the PCS in the late 1950s. On the one hand, they believed, the PCS had been "an ineffectual, clandestine organization" for most of its history that "appear [ed] to lack the capability to seize power by force or to gain political control through democratic processes." On the other hand, OCPA officers showed concern about the potential of the PCS to influence university and national politics.
11 According to C. Allan Stewart, the director of OCPA, the PCS endorsed Dr. Arturo Romero, a charismatic figure in the struggle against dictator Hernández Martínez in 1944, as a candidate for the Rector of the University of El Salvador in February1959. Romero returned to El Salvador from exile in Costa Rica at this time and received, in the words of Stewart, "a tumultuous reception" in San Salvador, and he was quickly labeled the "Fidel Castro of El Salvador." Romero did not accept the post of Rector and returned to Costa Rica, but the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador showed a great deal of concern about these events. 12 Thorsten Kalijarvi, the U.S. Ambassador in El Salvador, also expressed his dissatisfaction All in all, State Department officials thought it necessary to raise Lemus' apparent lack of resolve or skill to combat communism in El Salvador as a central issue during Lemus' state visit to the U.S.
formation like the PRAM and the PRD) and social movements. FNOC aimed at orienting "people on civic rights, and by extension and logic consequence, political [rights] ." 17 The chronology of events that resulted in the ousting of Lemus can be summarized as follows. In June 1960, Lemus reportedly told C. Allan Stewart and Donald P. Downs, the chargé d'affairs at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador that he had uncovered a plot against his government orchestrated from Costa Rica, which involved members of the Salvadoran opposition supported by Cuba. At this time, Lemus allegedly announced Stewart and Downs his intention to crackdown on the opposition. 18 Lemus declared PRAM illegal in July 1960, a decision that sparked widespread mobilization in San Salvador led by FNOC. 19 To counter FNOC 
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Tensions between the university community and the Lemus regime grew, as Lemus accused University authorities of plotting against his government to serve foreign interests and openly threatened university autonomy. 25 On September 1 1960, Lemus published an open letter to Rector Rodríguez Ruiz accusing the Superior University Council (SUC), the executive government of the University, of "creating a climate of national perturbation to serve international goals". In his letter, Lemus stated that the University was gradually becoming "a true bastion of subversion and propagation of dissolving doctrines" (i.e. Marxism) due to the work of "audacious minorities." Lemus also lectured Rodríguez Ruiz on the responsibilities of the rectory and on those of the SUC.
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On September 2, Lemus ordered a charge against the University. Lemus' crackdown on the university community was swift and brutal. Members of the National Police and National Guard entered the campus, beating to death Mauricio Esquivel Salguero, a university student and employee, and seriously injuring faculty, students, and workers. Rector Rodríguez Ruiz, Dr. Roberto Emilio Cuellar Milla, the Secretary General of the University and other university officials were also beaten and incarcerated. Oscar Fernández, who was barely five years old in 1960, recalled how his father, who was then a professor of law at the University of El Salvador, returned home badly wounded after the police beat him during the raid. 27 Judge Ulises Salvador
Alas estimated that damages of half million colones (two hundred thousand U.S. dollars) were inflicted on the university facilities during the raid. After the attack, the university closed down its activities not to reopen until after Lemus' downfall. 28 In the aftermath of the raid against the University, testimonies of the atrocities committed by the National Police and the National Guard emerged in the press. 29 The General Association is involved." Lemus and Kalijarvi also exchanged views on the "pattern of street fighting…and the evident importation of thugs from abroad and money supplied through Cuban channels," purportedly shown during the previous day demonstration. 39 Kalijarvi apparently did not mince words, encouraging Lemus to harden his position regarding the demonstrators. The U.S. Ambassador asked Lemus why "the student organization AGEUS had not been disbanded," to which Lemus replied that this action would be futile since there were a number of "illegal organizations such as the PRAM and the CGTS" that were also active. Kalijarvi criticized Lemus for exiling members of the opposition, arguing that this was holding free elections and to restore public freedoms. 49 Dr. Mario Castrillo Zeledón, the new General Prosecutor, also declared his intention to promote the "demilitarization" of the National
Police and the prosecution of policemen associated with Lemus' repression. 50 One of the Junta's first official acts was to release the National Police's secret files of those accused of "sedition and rebellion" during the Lemus regime. other Catholic intellectuals to form the PDC, which would become a major player in Salvadoran politics in the following three decades. 54 According to Héctor Dada, then a young Christian
Democrat leader, the foundation of the PDC and its "brutally anti-oligarchic" discourse generated anxieties among a range of political actors, from the PCS and U.S. government agencies to the ultraconservative sectors of Catholic Church, and the Salvadoran oligarchy itself.
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State Department officials debated whether to grant diplomatic recognition to the Junta.
While Ambassador Kalijarvi firmly opposed granting recognition to the Junta, other officials held the contrary view. Kalijarvi argued his case based on several assumptions. First, the Junta was formed by such "disparate" elements that it was doubtful that the new government could achieve stability and coherence. Moreover, there were insistent rumors about on going "conspiracies" and preparations for a counter coup. Second "pro-communist or communist" elements such as "the Ministers of Justice and Labor" dominated the Junta. Third, the Junta allowed the broadcasting of "Anti-American" messages on the radio and TV. Fourth, U.S. recognition would grant legitimacy to the Junta and encourage other groups in Central America to engage in similar actions against military regimes friendly to the U.S. And finally, former president Osorio, the strong man behind the coup, who was considered friendly to the U.S. government, could not control leftist members of the Junta. 56 In contrast to Kalijarvi, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann deemed that the U.S. government had a better possibility of influencing political events in El Salvador by granting recognition to the Junta. According to Mann, liberals or leftists "who advocated change in the still largely semi-feudal social order in El Salvador" were often deemed communists.
Mann wrote that the terms "leftist" and "communist" were often considered synonyms in El
Salvador, positing that "it would be a grave mistake" to consider that the Junta was dominated by "pro-Communist individuals" without having "substantiating evidence." Mann alleged that the best deterrence for "pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements" in the Junta were the Osorista military (followers of former president Oscar Osorio) who were undoubtedly "pro-American."
Moreover, Mann cited Osorio who claimed to be able to control any "extreme Leftists" and "to bring unity to the coalition" behind the Junta. Despite the growing rumors of a counter coup, On December 14, 1960, the Junta disbanded the municipal councils and mayors associated with the Lemus regime claiming that they were elected through fraudulent means and were rejected by the local population. 61 This action and the attempt to "demilitarize" the National Police, the Treasury Police, and the Fire Department apparently reinforced right-wing opposition to the Junta. 62 On December 21, 1960, unidentified individuals machine gunned the residence of General Prosecutor Castrillo Zeledón, nearly killing his ten year old son Mario.
Despite the attack against his house, Castrillo Zeledón vowed to continue prosecuting members of the National Police associated with Lemus' repression. 63 Leaders of PRAM visited the Junta on December 20, 1960 to express their support to the Junta's "democratic conduct." PRAM leaders also warned the Junta that if they failed to respond "with energetic measures" to the ongoing rightist plot against the Junta, "public freedoms would be gravely threatened and the country will be in danger of returning to the painful days of the tyranny." However the Junta did not take any assertive action to prevent a new coup. 64 The U.S. government delayed granting diplomatic recognition to the Junta based on the assumption that Osorio was unable to control Junta leftists who harbored sympathy toward the Cuban Revolution. Evidence of the Junta's alleged pro-Castro leanings included a radio talk show that broadcast anti-U.S. contents, the presence of a journalist of Prensa Latina (the Cuban press agency) in San Salvador, and the Junta's purported intention to create a popular militia. it created mistrust and malaise" among the ruling class and "that was the fundamental cause" for its downfall. Santacruz recalled that FNOC played the central role in the ousting of Lemus, it supported the Junta, but it was not represented and "had no possibilities to influence" the Junta. The Junta was indeed a reformist government isolated from the social movements that achieved few changes. "A few laws were approved," but they were largely ineffectual. In the end, the Junta created "a little space, an opening" that allowed the mobilization of FNOC. The Directorate closed down this opening.
In roughly eighteen months, the military-oligarchic regime was revamped under U.S.
tutelage to fit the "Alliance for Progress" model of governance, which featured economic modernization, industrialization, political reforms, and national security. 80 The Civilian-Military Directorate constituted by Colonel Rivera, "another colonel, and three civilians" took over power and declared martial law in January 1960. 81 The leaders of the coup initially invited Abraham classrooms, bathrooms, warehouses" as they perforated "big holes" in the walls in order to capture people who took refuge in those places. "Files, money and many other objects of the University and of employees" also disappeared during the charge. Judge Alas and the forensic experts who accompanied him showed particular indignation at the destruction of the portrait of Salvadoran cultural icon Francisco Gavidia. See "500 Mil Cols. En Daño a La Universidad," La Prensa Grafica, September 7 1960. 29
Archives of La Prensa Gráfica
René Angulo Urbina, a student of economics at the National University suffered cranial fractures, as well as "blows in the face and in other parts of the body." Forensic experts performed "medical-legal" exams to Teodoro Abel Moreno Guillén, Elda Lucila Guirola, Orlando López Peña, Roberto Góchez Hill, Rodolfo Ramírez Amaya, Vicente Argueta Escobar, Lotario Bayardo Gomez, Bonifacio García and numerous other victims of the raid who received medical treatment "at various medical centers of the capital." See "En El Hospital," La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960, "Estudiantes Golpeados Reconocidos Por El Juez," La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960. 30 See "Manifestación de Duelo," La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960, 31
See "Manifestación de Duelo," La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960. María Antonieta Rodríguez Arévalo told the press: "My husband is seriously ill. He has around thirty cranial fractures and other blows that have been diagnosed after he was freed. I, similarly, -showing her arms, legs and back-was also mercilessly beaten like many other ladies and eight students of a school located near the National University." See "Señora de Síndico Relata Atropello," La Prensa Grafica, September 7 1960. 32
Oddly, La Prensa Gráfica published a front page picture showing Canessa escorted by members of the notorious National Police's Directorate of Criminal Investigations which apparently saved Canessa from being forcibly disappeared. See "Canessa Agradece Foto que le Salvó la Vida," La Prensa Grafica October 31, 1960, "Ex-Canciller Detenido," La Prensa Grafica September 4, 1960.
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A picture of Dalton and his wife Aida, accompanied by José Reales Escobar, Angel Carballo Domínguez, José Snaton Bolaños Iraheta and José Balbino Rivera Herrera, the latter four labeled "Dalton's bodyguards," appeared in a one page advertisement issued by Lemus' public relations office to dismiss rumors that Dalton was disappeared by security forces. The advertisement also included a photo showing weapons, explosives and a number of books supposedly published in the Soviet Union. According to Lemus' public relations office, Dalton was captured, along with his "bodyguards" at Hacienda San Antonio near Rosario de la Paz on October 8, 1960. See "Severo Mentís a los Profesionales de la Calumnia y la Mentira: Roque Dalton García Capturado," ed. Relaciones Públicas de Casa Presidencial (La Prensa Grafica, October 13, 1960) . 34 Salvador Cayetano Carpio, then a member of the political commission of the PCS recalled the formation of the GAR as follows:
In nineteen fifty nine there was in our country a very important situation, namely the struggle against Lemus. The army entered the university amidst the booming of the mass movement.
Shafik Handal, Raúl Castellanos Figueroa and various other members of the political commission of the Communist Party were sent to exile. The Communist Party was sensitive to the moment. We started using (sic) action groups of four or five comrades to learn the use of arms. This was the origin of the Revolutionary Action Groups (GAR). We called for insurrection, but we did not achieve this objective because the movement was too young, but that in itself implied a shift: to unleash certain forms of armed struggle to oust a government.
See Demonstrators apparently stoned the facilities of La Prensa Grafica during a protest in August 1960, the next day editorial of La Prensa exhorted Lemus to take strong action against demonstrators. In reference to this incident, Delaney wrote "He [Dutriz] then launched into a lament admitting first that the papers' editorial policy had caused an economic boycott which had hurt, and second that the change in policy noticed last week had alienated the government. The paper felt alone, without protection, he said." According to Delaney,
